a reduced willingness to exert effort in the pursuit of reward. 48 aversion during effort-based decision-making. On the one hand, loss aversion may be 80 hardwired due to asymmetric evolutionary pressure on losses and gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 81 1979; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992b) , and thus should be 82 observed in any cost-benefit decision-making context. On the other hand, distinct brain regions 83 are involved in decision-making with different costs ( several studies have attempted to address this question, these either do not directly examine 89 loss aversion (Galaro et al., 2019) , do not involve the execution of the effortful action 90 (Nishiyama, 2016) or the cost of effort is confounded with the cost of temporal delay (Porat, 91 Hassin-Baer, Cohen, Markus, & Tomer, 2014). 92
The neurotransmitter dopamine appears to be crucial for effort-based decision-making. 93
For example, Parkinson's disease (PD) patients off dopaminergic medication exhibit a reduced 94 willingness to exert effort in the pursuit of reward, with medication restoring this imbalance 95 (Chong et Parkinson's disease patients on dopaminergic medication display an enhanced response to 98 reward but a reduced sensitivity to punishment (Collins & Frank, 2014; Frank, 2005; Frank, 99 Seeberger, & O' Reilly, 2004) . Although this suggests that dopamine availability might shape 100 loss aversion across contexts (Clark & Dagher, 2014; Timmer, Sescousse, Esselink, Piray, & 101 Cools, 2017), and in particular that medicated PD patients should show reduced loss aversion, 102 score greater than 25 (Table 1) . Table 1 summarises (x-axis) is the moment at which the participants indicated their choice and they were allowed 164 to start exerting the force. (E) Young participants (red), PD patients (green) and healthy age-165 matched controls (blue) all modulated their force appropriately. The solid black line indicates 166 the minimum required force. 167 participants, the index finger of the dominant hand was chosen to produce the force. For PD 174 patients, the index finger of the most affected side was chosen to produce the force (dominant 175 hand n=11, non-dominant hand n=7). For the healthy age-matched controls, we chose a similar 176 ratio of dominant hand and non-dominant hand as their force producing hand (dominant hand 177 n=12, non-dominant hand n=8). Following the MVC, participants had 12 trials to practise the 178 6 force levels that were used in the main decision-making task (see Effort-based decision-179 making task section for details). The force levels were shown to participants as a set of arcs 180 ( Figure 1A) . 181
The effort-based decision-making task consisted of 2 blocks (reward and punishment), 182 the order of which was counter-balanced across participants. Each block consisted of 10 183 repetitions of each of the 6 force levels, with a total of 60 trials in each block (15 repetitions 184 for the young age group, 90 trials in each block). Following the effort-based decision-making 185 task, participants were asked to produce 3 consecutive 3-second MVCs. They were instructed 186 that this had to be within 90% of the MVC they produced at the beginning of the experiment. 187 Importantly, participants were made aware of this requirement at the beginning of the study 188 (after the MVC and before the main decision-making task). This was intended to ensure that 189 they cared about not becoming over fatigued by always choosing the effortful (high reward, 190 low punishment) choice throughout. Therefore, all participants were encouraged to accumulate 191 as many points as possible (and lose as few points as possible), whilst avoiding unnecessary 192
effort. 193
Effort-based decision-making task 194
The task was adapted from classic effort-based decision-making paradigms (Bonnelle, 195 Manohar On each trial, participants were presented with a combination of points and a force level, 203 which was a percentage of their MVC (offer phase). For the young group, the force was 1 of 6 204 levels: 11, 21, 32, 42 53, 67% of MVC. For both the older age groups (PD and HC), these six 205 levels were: 9, 18, 27, 36, 45, 54% of MVC. The force levels used for the older age groups 206 were lower because a pilot study revealed they fatigued significantly faster than younger 207 participants. At the beginning of each block (reward, punishment), these six force levels were 208 paired with [5 10 15 20 25 30] points respectively. The initial pairings were selected based on 209 pilot experiments. Unbeknown to participants, the points associated with each force level were 210 then adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis using an adaptive staircase algorithm (Parameter 211 Estimation by Sequential Testing; Taylor & Creelman, 2005) . Specifically, the points offered 212 were increased or decreased using an initial step size of 8, depending on whether participants 213 rejected (skipped) or accepted the opportunity to execute the force in order to receive (or avoid 214 losing) those points. The step-size was doubled if participants rejected or accepted the offer (a 215 combination of force and points) 3 times in a row, and the step-size was halved if participants 216 reversed their decision on the force level, i.e., an acceptance followed by a rejection on a force 217 level or vice-versa (Taylor & Creelman, 2005) . As the staircase procedure was performed 218 independently for each of the six force levels, it allowed us to determine the point of subjective 219 indifference at which participants assigned equal value to acceptance and rejection for each 220 force level. The trial order was randomized across the 6 force levels. Importantly, the points 221 and force combinations offered in the reward and punishment conditions were under the same 222 adaptive procedure as described above, the only difference being whether the points were 223 framed as rewards or punishments (Figure 1 B,C; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . 224
Following the offer phase, participants indicated their choice by exerting a force on the 225 decision handle which moved the yellow decision cursor ( Figure 1A ) from the middle of the 226 screen into one of the option boxes (execute force or skip trial). As soon as participants 227 indicated their choice, the unchosen option disappeared. If the force option was chosen, 228 participants were required to execute the force on the handle with this being represented by the 229 blue force cursor moving from the start position towards a target line, and staying above the 230 target line for 4 seconds at which point they heard a cash register sound 'ka-ching' from the 231 headphone. If they failed to exert the required force, the trial was repeated. The trial was always 232 terminated 6.5 seconds after their choice. This meant that participants had to wait for 6 seconds 233 if they chose to skip the trial, or they had to produce the required force within 6 seconds. We 234 carefully controlled the time for force execution and skip decisions to be identical so that there 235 was no confound between delay and effort discounting as in previous studies (Doyle, 2010 
Data and statistical analysis
238 Data were analysed with Matlab using custom scripts. The data and codes are available 239 at https://osf.io/hw4rk/. Our first question was to ask if young healthy participants expressed 240 loss aversion during effort-based decision-making, i.e., a preference to exert more physical 241 effort in order to minimise punishment than maximise reward. For each of the six force levels, 242 we estimated the points at which the probability of accepting the force option was 50% (effort 243 indifference point). Specifically, for each force level, a logistic function ( = 1 1+ − ( − ) ) was 244 fitted to the points offered and the binary choices made by participants ( Figure 2 ). As shown 245
in Figure function is the discounting parameter, which denotes the steepness of how effort discounts 277 reward. That is, it represents the willingness to invest effort for a beneficial outcome. Therefore, 278 in our effort-based decision-making task, differences in choice behaviours between groups or 279 across reward and punishment conditions could potentially manifest as changes in the 280 discounting parameter of an effort discounting function. To test this, we fitted participant 281 responses using linear, parabolic and hyperbolic effort discounting functions, which are often 282 used to capture effort discounting (Białaszek et involved in order to gain a reward or to avoid a punishment, which was the percentages of each 288 individual maximum force (MVC). The parameter, l, is the steepness of the discounting 289 parameter, which can be interpreted as the unwillingness to exert effort. A higher value of l 290 represents less willingness by an individual to expend effort for the given outcomes. The 291 parabolic model is described by:
= − 2 (Hartmann et al., 2013) . This function implies 292 that additional effort devalues a reward to a greater extent if existing effort is high rather than 293 low. The hyperbolic model is described by: = 1+ (Mazur, 1987) . This function implies 294 that if additional effort is introduced to existing effort, it devalues reward more if the existing 295 effort is low rather than high. 296
The model space included all possible combinations of linear, parabolic and hyperbolic 297 effort discounting functions in each of the two conditions performed by PD and HC groups. To 298 compare the models, we utilised Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) . 299
Specifically, for each model, the BIC summed over all participants were compared (the lower 300 the value, the better the model fit) ( 
Results

307
Evidence for loss aversion in young healthy participants 308 Our first question was to ask if young healthy participants expressed loss aversion 309 during effort-based decision-making. To examine this, we first assessed how the effort 310 indifference point ( Figure 2) was affected by force level in the reward and punishment 311 conditions. As expected, the effort indifference point became progressively larger as the force 312 level became more demanding, indicating a sensitivity to effort across reward and punishment 313 conditions ( Figure 3A) . For each participant, an average effort indifference point was obtained 314 across force levels for the reward (reward IP) and punishment (punishment IP) conditions, with 315 the loss aversion index being defined as a ratio between these values (>1 = loss aversion; Figure  316 3B). As the loss aversion index was significantly greater than 1 (z=3.65, p<0.001, median=1.37, 317 Figure 3B ), it suggests that loss aversion was clearly evident in young healthy participants 318 during effort-based decision-making. reflected by participants being more willing to produce a force to avoid losses than receive 328 same-sized gains (higher reward IP than punishment IP given a force level). Loss aversion was 329 therefore quantified as a ratio between the reward IP and the punishment IP (loss aversion 330 index; y-axis). A value greater than 1 indicates loss aversion. 331 332
Reduced loss aversion in PD patients compared to HC 333
Similar to the young healthy participants, the effort indifference point for both the HC 334 ( Figure 4A ) and PD ( Figure 4B ) groups increased progressively as the force level became more 335 demanding, suggesting sensitivity to effort across reward and punishment conditions. In For each force level (x-axis), we estimated a score at which the probability of choosing to 341 produce the force was 50% (effort indifference point, y-axis). Given a particular force level, a 342 higher indifference point indicated less willingness to produce the force. Error-bars represent 343 SEM across participants. Grey indicates individual data points. (C-D) Loss aversion across 344 participants for the HC (C) and PD (D) groups. Loss aversion is reflected by participants being 345 more willing to produce a force to avoid losses than receive similar gains. Therefore, the loss 346 aversion index was measured as a ratio between the reward IP and the punishment IP (y-axis). discounting for PD patients in punishment, but not reward. 350 351 addition, as the loss aversion index was significantly greater than 1 for both HC (z=3.80, 352 p<0.001, median=2.04, Figure 4C ) and PD (z=3.37, p<0.001, median=1.27, Figure 4D ), it 353 indicates that loss version was present in both groups. Importantly, PD patients displayed 354 significantly less loss aversion than the HC group (z=2.23, p=0.025, Figure 4E ), with this 355 being a result of medicated PD patients appearing less sensitive to punishment ( Figure 4F) . revealed the PD and HC groups had a similar reward IP (p=0.13, Figure 4F ), but the PD 360 group displayed a higher punishment IP (p=0.007, Figure 4F ). 361 362 The effort discounting parameter represents the steepness of how effort discounts a 370 beneficial outcome, indicating a tendency to expend effort in pursuit of reward or avoid 371 punishment. Therefore, differences in choice behaviours between groups or across conditions 372 could potentially manifest as changes in the gradient of an effort discounting function. To test 373 this, we applied computational models of choice behaviours to estimate the subjective value of 374 each offer to each individual. We fitted participant choices to three typical discounting 375 functions. The model space included all possible combinations of linear, parabolic and 376 hyperbolic effort discounting functions in each of the two conditions performed by PD and HC 377 groups. We found that a parabolic effort discounting function provided the best fit for both the 378 PD and HC groups across the reward and punishment conditions ( (Table 2) . To reinforce these results, R 2 was found to be greater for the 385 parabolic function across all groups and conditions (Table 2) . Therefore, there appeared to be 386 no difference in the fundamental pattern of effort discounting between groups or conditions. 387 Using the winning model (parabolic function), we compared parameters across the PD 388 and HC groups. In the reward condition, the effort discounting parameter was found to be 389 similar between the HC and PD groups, suggesting medicated PD patients were equally as 390 motivated to exert effort in return for reward ( Figure 5A,B) . However, in the punishment 391 condition, the PD groups had an increased effort discounting parameter suggesting they were 392 less willing to exert effort in order to avoid punishment ( Figure 5A,C) . This was confirmed by 393 a two-way mixed ANOVA that showed a significant interaction between group (HC vs PD) 394 and condition (reward vs punishment) (F(1,37)=6.26, p=0.017). Bonferroni-corrected 395 independent t-tests revealed that while the discounting parameter (l) was similar between PD 396 and HC (p=0.342) for reward, it was significantly higher for the PD group in the punishment 397 condition (p=0.032, Figure 5A In summary, we have shown that loss aversion is consistently present during effort-408 based decision-making in young healthy participants and both people with Parkinson's disease 409 and healthy older adults. Although loss aversion is widely regarded as one of the most robust 410 and ubiquitous findings in economic decision-making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 411 & Kahneman, 1992) , the surprisingly few studies that have directly examined loss aversion 412 during physical effort-based decision-making have found it to not exist. For instance, Porat et 413 al., (2014) showed that while half of young healthy participants were willing to expend greater 414 effort to avoid punishment than to gain an equivalent reward, the other half showed the opposite 415 preference. In addition, Nishiyama, (2016) found a similarly large degree of variability across 416 participants in preference for maximising gains or minimising losses during an effort-based 417 decision-making task. Therefore, while both studies found differences between gain and loss 418 at an individual level, they did not find loss aversion during effort-based decision-making at a 419 group level. However, we believe that there are several issues with the previous studies which 420 may restrict their capacity to directly examine loss aversion during effort-based decision 421 making. First, in Porat et al., (2014) gaining reward or avoiding punishment required the 422 participant to execute additional key presses. As a result, to obtain more reward (or avoid more 423 punishment) the participants had to produce more effort and also had to wait longer. Therefore, 424 the additional effort cost was always confounded with a temporal delay cost. It is worth noting 425 that the temporal discount for losses are generally less steep than that for gains (Estle, Green, 426 Myerson, & Holt, 2006) . Importantly, this confound was carefully eliminated in our paradigm 427 as all trials, including the skip option trials, had identical durations. Second, in Nishiyama, 428 (2016), participants were tasked with making a series of choices of whether to engage in an 429 effortful task (to obtain reward or to avoid punishment) via a questionnaire. That is, participants 430 did not actually have to perform an effortful task. The absence of loss aversion could be a result 431 of participants being less sensitive to the imaginary effort involved in a questionnaire. This 432 possibility is supported by our results in which loss aversion is more clearly expressed at higher 433 effort levels. 434
The second key finding of the present study was that people with Parkinson's Disease 435 (PD) on medication showed a reduction in loss aversion compared to age-matched healthy 436 controls. Importantly, we found that this reduction in loss aversion was due to people with PD 437 investing similar physical effort in return for a reward but being less willing to produce effort 438 to avoid punishment compared to aged-matched healthy controls. Although previous studies 439 have already demonstrated that medicated PD patients are equally as motivated to exert effort 440 in return for reward as age-matched controls (Chong et al., 2015; Le Heron et al., 2018; 441 McGuigan et al., 2019) , this is the first study to reveal that medicated PD patients exhibit 442 reduced loss aversion during effort-based decision making as a result of a specific reduction in 443 their willingness to produce effort to avoid punishment. 444
To understand this reduced loss aversion in medicated PD patients, one key question is 445 whether it is due to an altered sensitivity to the cost of effort, an altered sensitivity to the action 446 outcomes or a combination of both. It has been repeatedly shown that PD patients exhibit 447 reduced willingness to expend effort in return of a reward, and dopaminergic medication is dopaminergic medication is best captured by a model that indicates dopamine increasing 464 sensitivity to action outcomes and not by it decreasing sensitivity to effort costs. Our data also 465 showed that PD patients did not show a generalised reduction in their willingness to engage in 466 effort across the reward and punishment conditions. Therefore, it seems plausible that the 467 altered choice behaviour in the PD group was not due to an increase in effort sensitivity but 468 was predominantly driven by an altered sensitivity to the expected action outcomes. 469
Consequently, the reduced loss aversion in medicated PD patients during our effort-470 based decision-making task could be due to dopamine availability modulating an individual's 471 sensitivity to reward and punishment-based action outcomes. In the domain of reinforcement 472 learning, dopamine manipulation studies in healthy participants and PD patients have revealed 473 that the balance between learning from reward and punishment is strongly modulated by 474 Therefore, in the context of the current study, medicated PD patients exhibited reduced loss 485 aversion because they had a normal sensitivity to reward-based action outcomes but a reduced 486 sensitivity to punishment-based action outcomes. However, demonstrating that the dissociable 487 influence of dopamine availability on reward-and punishment-based action outcome 488 sensitivity is independent of context would require further investigation. Specifically, PD 489 patients would need to show similar changes in loss aversion across decision-making under 490 risk and effort-based decision-making tasks, and this would need to be modulated by 491 medication state. 492
To counter this argument though, previous work has shown that the benefit/cost 493 analysis with different decision costs (e.g., effort, risk and delay) involve separable brain 494 regions. For example, the critical neural signature of effort-based decision-making has been 495 reported in the cingulate cortex, and not the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as typically 496 described for decision-making under risk (Klein-Flügge et al., 2016). Alternatively, therefore, 497 the current results could also be explained by effort being represented by separable dopamine-498 dependent brain regions when associated with reward or punishment-based action outcomes, 499 rather than dopamine specifically influencing action outcome sensitivity. For instance, multiple 500 studies have shown that when associated with reward effort is evaluated by dopamine-501 dependent brain regions such as the cingulate cortex, putamen and supplementary motor area Therefore, there is at least a suggestion, that similar brain regions are involved in the processing 509 of effort and punishment which are independent of the reward system. 510
In conclusion, loss aversion is clearly present during effort-based decision-making and 511 it can be modulated by altered dopaminergic state. This presents interesting future questions 512 surrounding clinical disorders that have shown a reduced willingness to exert effort such as 513 depression and stroke. For example, it is possible that disorders that have shown a reduced 514 willingness to exert effort in the pursuit of reward could show a normal, or even enhanced, 515 willingness to exert effort in order to avoid punishment. 516
